Mind Dynamics And Quantum Theory

I’m continuing our exploration on quantum physics and how, when understand the power we have to exceed our human potential; we will become empowered in our life.

A first question confronting a classically biased mind-brain researcher is this: How can two things so differently described and conceived as substantive matter and conscious thoughts interact in any rationally controlled and scientifically acceptable way. Within the classical framework this is impossible.

Therefore the usual tack has been to abandon or modify the classical conception of mind while clinging tenaciously to the “scientifically established” classical idea of matter, even in the face of knowledge that the classical idea of matter is now known by scientists to be profoundly and fundamentally mistaken, and mistaken not only on the microscopic scale, but on the scale of meters and kilometers as well (Tittel, 1998).

Experiments show that our experiences of instruments cannot possibly be just the passive witnessing of macroscopic physical realities that exist and behave in the way that the ideas of classical physical theory say that macroscopic physical realities ought to exist and behave.

Scientists and philosophers intent on clinging to familiar classical concepts normally argue at this point that whereas long-range quantum effects can be exhibited under rigorous conditions of isolation and control, all quantum effects will be wiped out in warm wet brains on a very small scale, and hence classical concepts will be completely adequate to deal with the question of the relationship between our conscious thoughts and the large-scale brain activities with which they are almost certainly associated.

That argument is incorrect.

The emergence of classical-type relationships arises from interactions between a system and its environment. These interactions induce correlations between this system and its environment that make certain typical quantum interference effects difficult to observe in practice, and that allow certain practical computations to be simplified by substituting a classical system for a quantum one.

However, these correlation (decoherence) effects definitely do not entail the true emergence – even approximately – of a single classically describable system. (Zurek, 1986, p.89 and Joos, 1986, p.12). In particular, if the subsystem of interest is a brain then interactions between its parts produce a gigantic jumble of partially interfering classical-type states: no single approximately classical reality emerges.

Yet if no – even-approximate – single classical reality emerges at any macroscopic scale, but only a jumble of partially interfering quantum states, then the investigation of an issue as basic as the nature of the mind-brain connection ought in principle to be pursued within an exact framework, rather than crippling the investigation from the outset by replacing correct principles by concepts known to be fundamentally and grossly false, just because they allow certain practical computations to be simplified.

This general argument is augmented by a more detailed examination of the present case. The usual argument for the approximate pragmatic validity of a classical conceptualization of a system is based on assumptions about the nature of the question that is put to nature. The assumption in the usual case is that this question will be about something like the position of a visible object.

Then one has a clear separation of the world into its pertinent parts: the unobservable atomic subsystem, the observable features of the instrument, and unobserved features of the environment, including unobserved micro-features of the instrument. The empirical question is about the observable features of the instrument. These features are essentially just the overall position and orientation of a visible object.

But the central issue in the present context is precisely the character of the brain states that are associated with conscious experiences. It is not known a priori whether or how a self-observing quantum system separates into these various parts. It is not clear, a priori, that a self-observing brain can be separated into components analogous to observer, observee, and environment.

Consequently, one cannot rationally impose prejudicial assumptions – based on pragmatic utility in simple cases in which the quantum system and measuring instrument are two distinct systems both external to the human observer, and strongly coupled to an unobservable environment – in this vastly different present case, in which the quantum system being measured, the observing instrument, and “the observer” are aspects of one unified body/brain/mind system observing itself.

In short, the practical utility of classical concepts in certain special situations arises from the very special forms of the empirical questions that are to be asked in those situations. Consequently, one must revert to the basic physical principles in this case where the special conditions of separation fail, and the nature of the questions put to nature can therefore be quite different.

The issue here is not whether distinct objects that we observe via our senses can be treated as classical objects. It is whether in the description of the complex inner workings of a thinking human brain it is justifiable to assume – not just for certain simple practical purposes, but as a matter of principle – that this brain is made up of tiny interacting parts of a kind known not to exist.

The only rational scientific way to proceed in this case of a mind/brain observing itself is to start from basic quantum theory, not from a theory that is known to be profoundly incorrect.

The vonNeumann/Wigner “orthodox” quantum formalism that I employ automatically and neatly encompasses all quantum and classical predictions, including the transition domains between them. It automatically incorporates all decoherence effects, and the partial “classicalization” effects that they engender.

Reference:

Attention, Intention, and Will in Quantum Physics – Henry P. Stapp, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory